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In recent years, China has engaged in a long-term effort to erode US dominance in critical 
industries and thereby undermine US influence in important world regions. If unaddressed, this 
could result in a future in which the United States’ ability to pursue its interests abroad is inhibited 
by an emboldened China and its capacity to ensure the security of its allies in Asia will be 
increasingly questioned. Given the dire implications of such a scenario, unchecked Chinese 
economic influence is an existential threat to the entire Western-led international order. In this 
paper, I approach this issue from a quantitative perspective and offer a data-driven methodology 
which can provide US intelligence analysts and policy makers with insights into the nature and 
risks posed by China’s economic activity around the world. Through the application of disparate 
datasets, the methodology calculates  vulnerability of countries to Chinese economic influence and 
highlights notable trends in global Chinese economic activity. 
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According to the World bank, China’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of 10% since the 1978 
reforms. As of their 2018 global GDP figures, China has a GDP of around $13.6 trillion (USD), 
making it the world’s second largest economy behind the United States with a GPD of around 
$20.4 trillion (USD).1 Given China’s current position as the world’s second most powerful global 
economy and its recent demonstrations of state power seemingly directed at the United States and 
its democratic allies, China’s heightened economic influence has become an issue of increasing 
concern to US policy makers and US national security agencies. As was prominently highlighted 
throughout the latest Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community published 
in January 2019, China is one of primary security threats currently facing United States and poses 
significant strategic risks to US global influence and the pursuit of its foreign economic, military, 
and geopolitical interests. The report particularly highlights the role of Chinese economic influence 
in its overall assessment of the threat represented by China’s expanding global reach:  
“We assess that China’s leaders will try to extend the country’s global economic, political, and 
military reach while using China’s military capabilities and overseas infrastructure and energy 
investments under the Belt and Road Initiative to diminish US influence. However, Beijing is likely 
to face political pushback from host governments in many locations, and the overall threat to US 
and partner interests will depend on the size, locations, and offensive military capabilities of the 
eventual Chinese presence.”2  
Due to the shared consensus of the US Intelligence Community in this interagency report regarding 
China’s position as one of the most pressing national security threats currently facing the United 
States, as well as the notable mention of the risks directly associated with heightened Chinese 
economic influence, I focused my research on evaluating Chinese global economic activity and 
assessing country risk exposure to Chinese economic influence. My professional background in 
data-driven intelligence analysis prompted my primary research question that I attempt to 
sufficiently answer throughout this paper: How can the US Intelligence Community leverage 
economic data to identify notable trends in Chinese global economic activity and apply this 
information to objectively assess relative country vulnerability to Chinese economic influence? 
  
2 
I approached this complex question by identifying several disparate sources containing 
transactional-level data on China’s global economic activities. I then developed a robust 
quantitative methodology designed to collectively combine the information included in the 
identified data sources and generate numeric scores reflecting each countries individual risk 
exposure to Chinese economic influence which I then used to provide 192 countries with a global 
vulnerability ranking in descending order from highest to lowest risk. Through the findings of 
supplemental data analysis and targeted open source research intended to properly contextualize 
and assess the veracity of my country vulnerability scores, I identified compelling trends and 
similarities in Chinese economic engagement across countries with comparable vulnerability 
rankings, indicating that the different compositions of Chinese economic engagement types 
observed in particular countries are reflective of China’s preferred vehicles of economic influence 
and seem to consistently correspond relative to the degree of calculated risk scores. I also 
conducted comparative analysis of country vulnerability rankings with UN voting data and 
observed a correlative relationship between calculated country risk scores and country vote 
cohesion with China on resolutions brought before the UN General Assembly.  
In addition to the academic value of my research, I assert that an improved version of my 
methodology can also provide tangible benefits and operational uplift to national security analysts 
supporting the China-focused missions and related collection efforts of the US intelligence 
community. Once enhanced through automation, live data streaming, change-detection alerting, 
additional economic data sources, and classified government information, I have high confidence 
that my methodology can be used as an effective tool by China-focused departments and mission 
centers of both civilian and military agencies within the US intelligence community, capable of 
supporting future efforts to mitigate the risks associated with expanded Chinese influence efforts 
and assist in the collective defense of critical US foreign interests currently threatened by malign 







Due to China’s swift ascension to its current status as the world’s second largest economy and its 
expanding global influence, there has been much academic discussion specifically focused on the 
topic of Chinese economic influence. Although opinions vary on China’s global economic activity 
and its relationship to expanded Chinese state influence, scholars generally agree that it is an issue 
of increasing concern which represents potential risks to the sovereignty of vulnerable world 
economies, poses ongoing challenges to US economic dominance, and threatens the longevity of 
the post-WWII international order led by allied Western democracies.  
In the qualitative studies “Awakening Giants: Feet of Clay” by Pranab Bardhan and “Chinese 
Economic Statecraft: Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy, and State Control” by William J. 
Norris, each author examines China’s rapid economic growth and their expeditious rise to a global 
economic superpower, however, Norris and Bardhan do so within different contextual 
frameworks. While Norris examines the challenges and security threats posed by Chinese 
economic influence as well as the scope of its overall comprehensive strategy to depose the 
economic dominance of Western Nations, Bardhan seeks to conduct a comprehensive analysis of 
China’s economic achievements outside of the security-based perspective of Norris. Bardhan 
instead focuses on Chinese economic growth in terms of the structural and institutional issues it 
faces moving forward. In doing so, Bardhan provides a fact-based and thoroughly researched 
economic outlook for China which allows for a grounded, realistic depiction of future growth. 
While Bardhams conclusions could be used to inform a future US and Western response to the 
threats of  Chinese economic influence, his work moderates the reasonable, yet sometimes alarmist 
predictions of Norris. Bardhan concludes that China’s authoritarian system provides mixed 
economic benefits but is not necessarily better nor more sufficient for economic development than 
the economic benefits provided by democratic systems of governance.  
For instance, Bardhan points out democratic societies, riddled with social and economic 
inequalities and conflicts, experience increased organizational difficulties when generating support 
for the collective action needed for lasting change and is frequently confronted with populist 
obstacles when attempting to incentivize long-term investment and implement institutional 




authoritarian governmental structure and minimal internal conflict, the Chinese leadership can be 
more decisive and purposeful in pursuit of economic reform and implementing long-term 
strategies, such as expanding its global influence, however, in the absence of institutionalized 
checks and balances present in democratic rule-based systems, there is a certain fragility in 
authoritarian governance related to the dangers of heavy-handed overreactions in responses to 
economic crises. Norris similarly characterizes the benefits of China’s authoritarian system but 
puts lets emphasis on the inherent weaknesses pointed out by Bardhan and instead, highlights 
China’s comparative advantages to western democracies when implementing economic strategies 
spanning several decades. According to Norris, the relatively short-term political cycles of 
democratic systems not only inhibit the United States and other Western countries’ ability to 
successfully implement and maintain economic grand strategies similar to that of China, but pose 
significant challenges to democratic governments when attempting to enact policies capable of 
countering China’s  expanding economic influence and effectively mitigate the future threats 
posed by the maturation of China’s existing grand strategies.  
In another qualitative study, “The BRICs and the Washington Consensus: An Introduction, Review 
of International Political Economy” by Cornel Ban and Mark Blyth, the authors examined the 
relationship rising economic powers such as Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs) have with 
the Washington Consensus (WC)i paradigm and what their success implies for the future of the 
global economic order.3 In conducting this research, Ban and Blyth attempt to fill the academic 
void of scholarly work aimed at analyzing the proliferation of WC ideas and economic policies in 
relation to the rise of the BRICs economies. The authors developed two central research questions 
they deemed critical in adequately exploring this special issue: “What did the Washington 
Consensus look like in practice? And how have the BRICs appropriated, adopted, adapted, or 
abandoned specific aspects of this transnational policy paradigm?”.  
In order to address these broad questions, the authors incorporated the literary works of several 
political scientists and sociologists as well as case studies on each BRICs country. The 
combination of diverse scholarly insights applied to the topic allowed for the authors to examine 
 
i The Washington Consensus refers to a set of free-market economic policies supported prominent financial 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury. A British economist 
named John Williamson coined the term Washington Consensus in 1989. (Source: Intelligent Economist; URL: 
https://www.intelligenteconomist.com/washington-consensus/) 
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the evolution of the relationship between BRICs and the WC over time. According to their 
findings, Ban and Blyth suggest that the BRICs economies have engaged in selective adoption of 
WC concepts and institutions. The authors argue that these countries, particularly China and 
Russia, only incorporated certain concepts that effectively created the illusion of compliance with 
the WC paradigm to avoid scrutiny yet avoided adopting those that would reduce the degree of 
state control over their economic systems. The authors conclude that by doing this, BRICs 
economies have neither pioneered a post-neoliberal transformation, nor have they proved 
themselves to be committed to the WC paradigm to the same degree as the US and other large 
global economies. 
While the qualitatively focused studies outlined above provide valuable insights and contextual 
insights into the role of economic activity in China’s overarching strategy to expand its global 
influence, I found the existing quantitative works to provide more concrete evidence regarding the 
actual means of economic engagement China leverages to bolster its influence in foreign target 
countries. For instance, in the recent 2019 study “China's Overseas Lending” by Sebastian Horn, 
Carmen M. Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch, the authors address the issue of Chinese “hidden 
debts” by evaluating the size, characteristics, and determinants of China’s capital exports by 
analyzing global financial loan data.4  
Through leveraging this data, encompassing 5,000 Chinese loans and grants to 152 countries from 
1949-2017, this study found that 50% of China’s lending to developing countries is not reported 
to the IMF or World Bank and represent “hidden debts” that distort and obscure policy 
surveillance, risk pricing, and debt sustainability analyses. Since China’s overseas lending is 
almost entirely state-controlled, the authors  argue that the standard “push” and “pull” drivers of 
private cross-border capital flows do not apply in the same way as they do for the lending activities 
of other countries. Therefore, these “hidden debts” can be used as an effective tool for Chinese 
economic influence efforts in vulnerable target countries that goes relatively unnoticed and does 
not receive the proper scrutiny of international monetary institutions and regulatory bodies.  
In another recent quantitative study conducted by William & Mary’s AidData Research Lab, 
“Connective Financing: Chinese Infrastructure Projects and the Diffusion of Economic Activity in 
Developing Countries” by Richard Bluhm, Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks, Austin 




financed aid projects in 138 countries from 2000 – 2014 to explore the ways in which Chinese 
development projects influence the geographic distribution of economic activity within low-
income and middle-income countries. The study highlights that China recently become a major 
financier of economic infrastructure in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Central 
and Eastern Europe, however, it is unclear if these investments diffuse or concentrate economic 
activity.  
The authors address this issue through analyzing their data and found that generally, Chinese 
development projects reduce economic inequality within and between subnational localities. The 
study also found that Chinese transportation projects in particular had a significant impact, 
suggesting that Chinese investments in “connective infrastructure” produce positive economic 
spillovers which lead to a more equal distribution of economic activity in the localities where they 
are implemented. Although this study does not particularly discuss how this impacts Chinese 
economic influence efforts, however, their findings on the positive economic results of Chinese 
government-financed development projects in countries with relatively weak economies, suggests 
that target countries benefiting from these projects may be more easily swayed by Chinese 
influence efforts.5 
The 2019 study “Rogue aid? An Empirical Analysis of China’s Aid allocation” by Dreher, Axel 
and Andreas Fuchs also leverages Chinese aid project data but has a more pointed focus on its 
relationship to Chinese economic influence.6 In this work, the authors base their study off the 
characterization of foreign aid projects from China as "rogue aid" that is selfishly guided by 
furthering Chinese state interests. To address the veracity of this characterization, the study 
calculates the total monetary value of Chinese aid projects, including food aid, financial aid, and 
medical aid, provided to developing countries from 1956-2006 to empirically test the extent to 
which self-interests shape China's aid allocation. Through their analysis of this data, the authors 
found that political considerations shape China's allocation of aid, however, China does not pay 
substantially more attention to politics compared to Western donors. Additionally, they found that 
China's aid allocation appears to be widely independent of recipients' endowment with natural 
resources and institutional characteristics. Therefore, the study concludes that overall, the 




The 2015 study “Which Countries are most exposed to China?” by Paolo Mauro and Jan Zilinsky 
is another notable quantitative study on Chinese economic influence that has significant relevance 
to my methodology regarding its intended purpose of assessing country vulnerability.7 In this 
study, the authors leverage merchandise export data between 2007 – 2015, sourced from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), to identified which countries have the highest exposure to 
China through direct trade linkages. From their analysis of the data, the authors found that overall, 
trade exposure to China has increased in all G-20 economies since 2007, except for India and 
Argentina. Regarding the more pointed findings of the study, the authors highlight that China’s 
regional neighbors had some of the largest ratios of exports to China in total exports, including 
Australia, South Korea, Japan. They also found Commodity exporters, such as Brazil  and Saudi 
Arabia, featured prominently in their results. Beyond the G-20, the study found that several of the 
countries sharing a border with China accounted for notably large percentages of Chinese exports, 
such as Mongolia, North Korea, and Turkmenistan. The authors also identified several commodity 
exporters outside of the G-20 with similarly high percentages of Chinese exports, particularly the 
African economies of Angola, Republic of Congo, Gambia, and Mauritania. 
In my review of existing qualitative academic studies on Chinese economic influence, I found 
these works to provide robust contextual information illuminating the nature of China’s 
geopolitical interests and insightful conclusions on the unique incentives likely driving its 
economic behavior in the foreign countries it seeks to influence. The more quantitatively focused 
studies I reviewed make similarly valuable contributions but leverage various types of economic 
data to provide compelling arguments highlighting the relationships between certain types of 
economic activities and Chinese economic influence. Out of all the existing literature I evaluated, 
I found these quantitative works to have the highest degree of relevance to my research and 
collectively represent the data-focused portion of academic exploration into this topic in which I 
intend to add value. Without minimizing the importance of the arguments and notable findings 
presented in existing quantitative works, I found a majority of these works be limited by their niche 
focus on specific Chinese economic activities or Chinese economic engagement with countries 
located in particular world regions.  
I argue that the added value of my research to existing works pertains to the global scale of my 




to numerically calculate country vulnerability. In addition to openly available data sources that 
were individually evaluated by scholars in previous studies, my methodology also leverages data 
from proprietary sources that have not yet been applied to academic research on this topic. 
Furthermore, I conducted a globally focused assessment through my methodology that calculated 
country vulnerability to Chinese economic influence encompassing 192 countries across nine 
world regions. Without fully leveraging the vast amounts of available economic data and to 
generate combined insight, I argue that the evidence presented in these works do not provide a 
holistic view of Chinese global economic activities and represents the major missing component 



















In order calculate country vulnerability to Chinese economic influence, I first had to identify the 
appropriate data sources needed by my methodology to produce tangible results. Given the 
international scope and inherent complexity of my research question, these data sources would 
have to contain high volumes of transactional-level economic information capable of identifying 
the countries within China’s expansive global economic engagement network. These data sources 
would also have to represent a diverse range of economic activities that when combined and 
applied to my methodology, would provide a holistic view of both the typology and nature of 
Chinese economic influence efforts throughout the world.  
Following a period of extensive research and subsequent vetting of various potential candidates, I 
selected six data sources which were sufficiently comprehensive and compatible with the structure 
of my methodology. In aggregate, these disparate data sources encompass China’s bi-directional 
economic relationship with over 200 countries, overseas territories, and dependent areas, however, 
I limited my assessment to the 192 countries within China’s global economic engagement network 
that are recognized Member States of the United Nations (UN). The identified data sources 
include: International Trade Transactions, Foreign Investment, Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
Deals, Foreign subsidiaries, International Aid Projects, and Chinese Construction Contracts. (See 
full data source descriptions below) 
International Trade Transactions (Import/Export) (2007-2017) 8  
• Data Source – World Bank  
• Source Type – Open-Source  
• Data Coverage – Bi-Directional 
o 2,966,042 Chinese Exports to Target Countries (Target Country Imports) 






Foreign Investment (2007-2019)ii 9 
• Data Source – Thomson Reuters Eikon  
• Source Type – Proprietary 
• Data Coverage – Bi-Directional  
o 5,104 Chinese Investments in Target Countries 
o 60,211 Target Country Investments in China 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) Deals (2007-2019)10  
• Data Source – Thomson Reuters Eikon  
• Source Type – Proprietary 
• Data Coverage – Bi-Directional  
o 2,555 Chinese M&A Deals in Target Countries 
o 3,105 Target Country M&A Deals in China 
Foreign Subsidiaries (Current as of 2019)11 
• Data Source – Uniworld Online 
• Source Type – Proprietary 
• Data Coverage – Bi-Directional (China & Target Countries) 
o 2,173 Chinese Subsidiaries in Target Countries 
o 21,641 Target Country Subsidiaries in China 
International Aid Projects (2007-2014)12  
• Data Source – AidData.org (William & Mary Global Research Institute) 
• Source Type – Open-Source  
• Data Coverage – Bi-Directional  
o 3,588 Chinese Aid Projects in Target Countries 
o 0  Target Country Aid Projects in China 
 
 
ii Foreign Direct Invest includes all bi-directional private equity transactions (2007-2017), public company share 




Chinese Infrastructure Development (Construction) Contracts (2005-2017)13 
• Data Source – American Enterprise Institute (AEI) 
• Source Type – Open-Source  
• Data Coverage – Unidirectional 
o 1,329 Foreign Chinese Construction Contracts 
Data Source Selection 
My rationale behind selecting these data sets was their global scalability, coverage of China-related 
economic interactions, transactional-level detail, and encompass economic activities with 
relevance to Chinese economic influence. Another major contributing factor in my decision to 
select these data sources was because the online platforms housing the raw information of these 
data sets had user interfaces which allowed for targeted querying and bulk extractions of China-
related transactions.  
Essentially, when building a complex methodology designed to generate a singular combined 
insight from disparate data sources that need to be merged together manually, such as a numeric 
vulnerability score for each country, the best approach is to incorporate as much relevant data that 
can be identified within the scope of the question or topic you are attempting to address. In the 
case of this research, the scope of both my research question and topic were of a global scale. As 
can be seen in the data source descriptions outlined above, the international trade data 
encompassed over 3.5 million records of import and export transactions while the other data 
sources contained thousands of relevant Chinese and target country transactions for each 
individual economic activity type. Therefore, the ability to query identified data sources for China-
related transactions and extract the data in bulk was critical for the development of my 
methodology as well as its capability to produce accurate results.  
Three of the data sets are open source  (International Trade Transactions, International aid projects, 
Chinese Construction Contracts) and have been used in previous scholarly works on Chinese 
economic influence, however, as was stated in my literature review, these data sources were 
evaluated individually. Given that the methodology I developed is designed to generate 
vulnerability scores from all six data sources in aggregate, the application of these open-source 
data sets in my research is not duplicative of existing scholarly works. An additional added value 




Deals, Foreign-Owned Subsidiaries) that to my knowledge, have not yet been leveraged in 
published academic research discussing Chinese economic influence.  
Most of these data sources contained bi-directional data meaning that that the source contained 
information on Chinese economic activity into target countries as well as information on target 
country economic activity of the same type back into China. The “International Aid Projects” data 
source is technically bi-directional since it has global coverage and is not a China-specific 
database, however, it is an outlier amongst the other bi-directional data sources included in my 
methodology since the data naturally did not show any target country aid projects in China. The 
“Chinese Construction Contracts” was the only selected data source that was unidirectional, 
meaning that the data was restricted to information on outward-facing Chinese construction 
contracts in target countries and did not include the converse of target country construction 
contracts in China. The lack of bi-directional exchange in the “Chinese Construction Contract” 
data source is since it was originally created by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) to be a 
China-specific database. While this does not necessarily mean that none of the evaluated target 
countries have construction contracts in China, such information was beyond the scope of the 
available data. 
Data Inconsistencies & Information Gaps 
As is a common reality in any attempt to generate collective insight from merged disparate data, 
there are certain information gaps and inconsistencies across the selected data sources that warrant 
mention. First, it is important to note that the representation of countries in the transactional-level 
economic information contained within these data sources are largely dependent upon the 
transparency and reporting activities of the ruling governments in those countries. Countries that 
rarely disclose details on their global economic activities or related financial transactions with 
international markets, such as Iran and North Korea, have minimal presence in the available 
economic information and their representation in the data likely does not provide an accurate 
depiction of their existing economic relationship with China. It is also important to note that there 
are discrepancies amongst the data source regarding the temporal coverage of their associated 
economic activities. For instance, I was able to extract foreign investment transactions up to 2019, 
while the data source for international aid projects only provides activity up to 2014. Although it 
would have been preferable to have a consistent coverage period for each data source, they include 




highlighted discrepancies in their temporal coverage are not to the degree in which it would have 
a detrimental impact on the methodology. 
Methodology 
Guided by extensive research into the concept of economic statecraft and my underlying 
hypothesis of the unique relationship between the ultimate state control of China’s economic 
system and Chinese economic influence, I designed my methodology to calculate country 
vulnerability through the interactions of active and passive economic traits of potential target 
countries: 
• Active Trait – The degree of financial leverage China possesses in its existing bi-directional 
economic relationships with target countries. 
• Passive Trait – The relative economic strength (GDP & GDP per Capita) of the target 
countries engaging with China.  
In my four-step methodology, I generated numeric values representing the defined active and 
passive traits of vulnerability for each target country, calculated the overall vulnerability of target 
countries to Chinese economic influence and provided them with a corresponding country 
vulnerability rank, and lastly, identified correlative relationships and measured potential impacts 
of country vulnerability to target state behavior.  
The logic behind my data-driven methodology and my expectations of its capability to produce 
accurate numeric representations of relative country risk exposure to Chinese economic influence, 
was conceptually based upon China’s ultimate state control of its domestic and international 
economic activities. China has transformed dramatically since its economic reforms; however, its 
authoritarian government and the inherently statist nature of the Communist Party of China (CPC) 
have remained fundamentally unchanged since 1949. These are foundational aspects of China’s 
governmental system that have been consistent throughout its evolution into a major economic 
world power and therefore, it cannot be viewed as a country that perceives nor engages the modern 





Unlike China, the conduct of US and other large Western economies in the international free-
market system is fundamentally guided by their adherence to the core capitalist principles 
associated with private enterprise and limited state control. These central tenets of capitalism 
emphasize the critical importance of independent, self-sustaining businesses to drive global 
markets and freely pursue their own corporate and financial interests with minimal government 
interference. Within this system, the state has the authority to directly intervene in the market when 
necessary, however, under normal circumstances national governments are meant to primarily 
serve as external market forces that provide a legal structure and regulatory framework in which 
private enterprise operates. In direct contradiction to this concept, the state’s relationship to China-
based companies is one of complete control in which the Chinese government intimately dictates 
their business operations, corporate relationships, and financial transactions; especially those 
involving foreign companies in international markets. This extreme degree of state authority over 
China’s domestic and international economic activities is firmly cemented within the political 
power structure of its authoritarian-style communist government, representing a key difference 
separating China from the US and other major economic powers operating within the capitalist 
free-market system.  
In light of this difference, I hypothesized that any notable patterns or trends observed through my 
analysis of the selected economic data sources would likely reflect Chinese state interests and 
provide a relatively accurate depiction of the targeted economic engagement methods China 
employs to further its political influence within certain countries and world regions. Through this 
underlying logic, it is rational to assume that when applying these same economic data sources to 
my methodology designed to calculate country vulnerability, the resulting scores would provide 










Methodology Step #1 – Calculating the Active Trait of Chinese Financial Leverage 
To calculate China’s economic leverage within the existing bi-directional economic relationship 
it shares with each target countries (Active Trait), I subtracted the total the dollar and volume 
values of China’s externally facing economic activities within each target country (Chinese 
Outward Economic Engagement) by the corresponding total dollar and volume values of 
internally-facing economic activities of each target country back into China (Target Inward 
Economic Engagement).  
I incorporated the total volumes of each type of economic activity along with their associated total 
dollar values in my assessment due to an information gap identified in the data, which was a 
significant number of unreported dollar values for recorded investment and M&A transactions 
between China and the 192 target countries evaluated. I found that when only applying the total 
equity amounts for these economic engagement types, the several transactions without any 
reported equity amounts would be discounted and therefore, not accurately reflect the existing bi-
directional economic relationships between the China and the 192 potential target countries.  
My calculations for Chinese Outward Economic Engagement and Target Inward Economic 
Engagement used the dollar and volume totals for all economic activities except international 
trade, which was calculated separately and only for total dollar values. I decided to calculate 
international trade separately due to the significantly higher dollar values for annual country to 
country exchanges represented in the international trade data than all of the other economic activity 
types. Additionally, the international trade data did not have the information gap of unreported 
dollar values for recorded transactions like the other economic activity types and similarly 
calculating trade volume totals along with dollar amount totals was unnecessary. With this 
structure in place, my methodology provided each country with six separate values, including 
dollar, volume, and trade totals for Chinese Outward Economic Engagement and Target Inward 
Economic Engagement:  
Chinese Outward Economic Engagement (China → Target Country): 
1. Outward Economic Activity Dollar Value = China Foreign Investment $ Total (+) China 
M&A deals $ Total (+) Annual Revenue $ Total of Chinese Parent Companies with 






2. Outward Economic Acitvity Volume = China Foreign Investment Volume Total (+) 
China M&A Deals Volume Total (+) China Subsidiary Volume Total (+) Chinese Aid 
Project Volume Total (+) Chinese Construction Contract Volume Total 
 
3. Outward International Trade Value = $ Totals of Chinese Exports to Target Country 
Target Outward Economic Engagement (Target Country → China): 
1. Inward Economic Activity Dollar Value = Target Foreign Investment $ Total (+) Target 
M&A deals $ Total (+) Annual Revenue $ Total of Target Country Parent Companies with 
Subsidiary Presence in China (+) Target Country Aid Project $ Total (+) Target 
Construction Contract $ Total 
 
2. Inward Economic Activity Volume = Target Foreign Investment Volume Total (+) 
Target M&A Deals volume Total (+) Target Subsidiary Volume Total (+) Target Aid 
Project Volume Total (+) Target Construction Contract Volume Total 
 
3. Inward International Trade Value = $ Total of Target Country Exports to China 
After finding the Outward and Inward Economic Engagement  totals, I generated three new values 
for each of the 192 target countries: dollar, volume, and trade net difference. I calculated the net 
differences by subtracting Outward Economic Engagement values by Inward Economic 
Engagement values for each of the three corresponding types (Dollar Value, Volume, and 
International Trade Value). 
1. Dollar Net Difference = China Outward Engagement $ Totals (-) Target Inward 
Engagement $ Totals  
 
2. Volume Net Difference = Outward Engagement Volume Totals (-) Inward Engagement 
Volume Totals 
 
3. International Trade Net Difference = $ Total of China Exports to Target Country (-) $ 




According to my methodology, the resulting net difference values reflect the degree of Chinese 
financial leverage held within its bi-directional economic relationship with the 192 target countries 
evaluated. Due to the uniform formulaic structure of each net difference calculation as China 
Outward Engagement (-) Target Inward Engagement, positive values indicate China has more 
overall economic activity within the target country than the target country has within China and 
conversely, negative net difference values indicate that the target country has more overall 
economic activity within China than China has within the target country. Therefore, the higher net 
difference value, the greater the degree of China’s financial leverage in the target country and the 
lower the net difference value, the lesser the degree of China’s financial leverage in the target 
country.  
In order to generate a numeric representation of total Chinese financial leverage for each target 
country, I listed the target countries in descending order by the three net differences and provided 
countries with a rank of 192 to 1 for each value. For example, the country with the highest value 
for dollar net difference would receive a rank of 192 while the country with the lowest value for 
dollar net difference receive a rank of 1. By adding the numeric rankings of dollar, volume, and 
international trade net difference, I generated a total Chinese Financial Leverage Score for each 
target country. According to my methodology, this score is a numeric representation of Chinese 
financial leverage within the 192 target countries observed to have a bi-directional economic 
relationship with China. For clarification, see the examples of the countries with the highest and 
lowest Chinese Financial Leverage Scores below. (Tables 1 & 2) 
TABLE 1: HIGHEST CHINESE FINANCIAL LEVERAGE SCORE – VIETNAM 














$1,700,281 186 127 188 $228,123,129 186 560 
 
TABLE 2: LOWEST CHINESE FINANCIAL LEVERAGE SCORE – SWITZERLAND 














       





Methodology Step #2 – Calculating the Passive Trait of Country Economic Strength 
Generating a numeric representation of China’s financial leverage in target countries is a critical 
component of quantifying overall country vulnerability to Chinese economic influence, however, 
I argue that target countries are not equally impacted by the Chinese financial leverage scores 
calculated in Step #1 and must be further contextualized by generating an additional score that 
represents the relative economic strength (Passive Trait) of target countries. My reasoning behind 
this is founded in the assumption that the true power of Chinese financial leverage is  
fundamentally determined by the size and strength of the target country’s economy. Simply put, I 
assert that Chinese economic influence efforts in target countries with similar Chinese Financial 
Leverage Scores are more likely to be successful in those with relatively weaker economies. 
Despite having comparable degrees of Chinese financial leverage, stronger economies will 
naturally have higher resilience to Chinese influence than weaker economies due to their greater 
negotiating power when economically engaging with China and enhanced ability to institute 
effective countermeasures in response to Chinese economic coercion.  
For example, Vietnam and Indonesia have similar Chinese Financial Leverage Scores, yet have 
differed dramatically in their economic engagement with China. By solely interpreting the 
comparable Chinese Financial Leverage Scores for these Southeast Asian countries, one would 
expect both Vietnam and Indonesia to exhibit a similar degree of acquiescence to Chinese efforts 
of economic expansion within their borders, however, Indonesia has demonstrated far greater 
resistance to Chinese economic encroachment than Vietnam in recent years.14 I argue that the 
reason for Indonesia’s heightened resistance to Chinese economic influence and real-world state 
behavior contradicting that of Vietnam, another Southeast Asian country with a similarly high 
Chinese Financial Leverage Score, is Indonesia’s significantly larger and more diverse economy. 
Therefore, an accurate quantification of overall country vulnerability to Chinese economic 
influence requires the inclusion of an additional score that contextualizes the impact of Chinese 






To calculate the overall economic strength of target countries (Target Economic Strength Score),  
I used the most recent estimations of country GDP and GDP per Capita provided by the World 
Bank. The formula for this calculation is as follows: 
Target Economic Strength = GDP Rank (+) GDP per Capita Rank 
The process of generating this score was similar to the combining of ranked values demonstrated 
in Step #1, however, for this calculation I provided target countries with a GDP and GDP per 
Capita rank from 192 to 1 after listing them in ascending rather than descending order. I did this 
to maintain consistency in my methodology with my underlying assumption of weaker economies 
having greater vulnerability to Chinese economic influence than stronger economies. For example, 
countries with the lowest GDP and GDP per received a rank of 192 while the countries with the 
highest GDP and GDP per capita received a rank of 1. For clarification, see the examples of the 
countries with the highest and lowest Chinese Financial Leverage Scores below. (Tables 3 & 4) 
TABLE 3: LOWEST TARGET ECONOMIC STRENGTH SCORE – GUINEA-BISSAU 
 GDP (M USD) GDP 
Rank 
GDP per Capita 
(USD) 
GDP per Capita 
Rank 
Economic Strength Score 
$1,164.94 174 $620.00 191 365 
 
TABLE 4: HIGHEST TARGET ECONOMIC STRENGTH SCORE – UNITED STATES 
GDP (M USD) GDP 
Rank 
GDP per Capita 
(USD) 
GDP per Capita 
Rank 
Economic Strength Score 
$18,624,475.00 1 $57,400.00 11 12 
 
Methodology Step #3 – Calculating Country Vulnerability  
In order to generate overall scores for target countries representing their relative vulnerability to 
Chinese economic influence (Target Vulnerability Score) and their corresponding rank within the 
population of 192 countries evaluated (Target Vulnerability Rank), I combined the values of 
Chinese Financial Leverage Score with Target Economic Strength Score for each target countries: 





I then ranked the resulting values of each target country in descending order from highest to lowest 
Target Vulnerability Score and provided them with a rank from 1 to 192. For example, the country 
with the highest Target Vulnerability Score received a rank of 1 while the country with the lowest 
Target Vulnerability Score received a rank of 192. To clarify further, see the examples of the 
countries with the highest and lowest Target Vulnerability Scores below. (Tables 5 & 6) 
TABLE 5: HIGHEST TARGET VULNERABILITY SCORE – CAMBODIA 
Financial Leverage Score Economic Strength 
Score 
Vulnerability Score Vulnerability Rank 
507 249 756 1 
 
TABLE 6: LOWEST TARGET VULNERABILITY SCORE – SWITZERLAND 
Financial Leverage Score Economic Strength Score Vulnerability Score Vulnerability Rank 
12 27 39 192 
 
According to my methodology, countries with high Target Vulnerability Scores are more 
susceptible to Chinese economic influence due to their relatively weak economies and greater 
Chinese leverage in their existing bi-directional economic relationship with China. China’s efforts 
to coerce, pressure, or subjugate these target countries of heightened vulnerability through 
economic means are generally more effective and more likely to successfully alter target state 
behavior in ways that further Chinese strategic interests. Conversely, countries with low Target 
Vulnerability Scores are more resilient and less susceptible to Chinese economic influence efforts. 
These low vulnerability countries generally have larger, stronger economies and either dominate 
their economic relationship with China or maintain a relatively balanced economic exchange with 
China. Strong economies in which China possesses minimal leverage, are not only more capable 
of adequately defending themselves against China’s attempts at economic coercion, but are less 
likely to be targeted by Chinese economic influence efforts in the first place due to the potential 
of operational blowback for China, which could result in negative consequences that have 




Methodology Step #4 –Measuring Potential Impact State Behavior 
The final step in my methodology is to assess the impacts of country vulnerability on state 
behavior. The reasoning behind this next research objective was to first test the accuracy of my 
country vulnerability results and verify my hypothesis that countries with higher scores are more 
likely to demonstrate state behaviors indicative of subservience or acquiescence to Chinese 
economic interests. Guided by the country vulnerability scores calculated in Step #3, it was not 
difficult to identify various qualitative examples through open source research that supported this 
assumption, like the previously provided Indonesia-Vietnam example. However, to test for the 
impacts of generated country vulnerability scores and transactional economic activity data, my 
methodology required a quantitative representation of state behavior on a global scale. This was 
provided by a comprehensive dataset of UN General Assembly voting records constructed by 
researchers at Harvard University. Given my evaluation period of bi-directional economic 
engagement with China from 2007-2019, I limited my assessment of the available UN voting 
records from 2007-2017. I used this targeted sample of UN voting data set, encompassing 809 UN 
General Assembly resolutions and a total of 103,005 country votes, to calculate the percentages of 
country vote solidarity and opposition with China.   
To calculate country solidarity and cohesion with China, I compared the votes cast by China and 
the 192 target countries for each resolution and designated each country vote with a banding of 
Cohesive” (Agreed) or “Oppositional” (Disagreed) depending on whether or not it corresponded 
with China’s casted “YES” or “NO” vote on the 809 UN General Assembly resolutions evaluated. 
I then tallied the total amounts of country cohesive and oppositional vote designations and 
calculated their corresponding percentages for the total number of  country votes, attributing each 
country with a percentage reflecting its overall cohesion or vote solidarity with China as well as 
the percentage of its votes opposing those cast by China. Lastly, I applied logistical regression to 
identify any observable correlative relationships between target country vulnerability scores, 
average vulnerability scores per world region, and economic activity volumes with calculated UN 





Results & Key Findings  
In this section, I will review my findings on country vulnerability and observed relationships 
between country vulnerability scores, specific economic activity types, and UN vote solidarity. I 
also will review the results of a statistical experiment I conducted on the data in which I applied 
logistical regression analysis to identify any correlations existing between UN vote solidarity 
percentages and different types of Chinese economic activity, as well as country regional location.  
Ranking Country Vulnerability 
My country vulnerability scores, generated from various open-source and proprietary data sets, 
quantitatively reflect the relative risk exposure of 192 countries to Chinese economic influence. 
(Figure 1) (See complete results in Appendix A) As was stated in my methodology section, the 
scores encompass several different types of economic engagement, that together, holistically 
define China’s unique bi-directional economic relationship with each potential target country over 
the evaluation period from 2007-2019. I assert the combined application of disparate economic 
data sources and current global GDP and GDP per capita estimates allowed for accurate, 
contextualized quantifications of country vulnerability to Chinese economic influence validated 
by qualitative findings on real-world country interactions with China identified through academic 
and open-source research. It is important to note that several countries received the exact same 






According to my methodology, the top ten most vulnerable countries to Chinese economic 
influence are Timor-Leste, Cambodia, Liberia, Vietnam, Pakistan, Nepal, Niger, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tanzania, and Mozambique. (Table 7) Tanzania and Mozambique had the exact same vulnerability 
score and received the same ranking, however, I chose not to represent this in the table of the top 
10 to avoid confusion. I assert that these countries are exposed to the highest degree of risk of and 
are the most likely to be successfully coerced and manipulated  Chinese economic influence 
efforts. When analyzing Chinese economic activity in each specific country, there are observable 
similarities in the composition of economic engagement types and their associated volumes. For 
example, Chinese economic activity in the top ten most vulnerable countries is largely dominated 
by high volumes of Chinese aid projects and construction contracts with minimal amounts of 
foreign direct investment, M&A, and subsidiary locations. Conversely, Chinese economic activity 
in the top ten least vulnerable countries deemed to be the most resilient is largely composed of 
high volumes of foreign direct investments, M&A, and subsidiary locations with comparatively 
insignificant amounts of aid projects and construction contracts.















The most resilient countries with the lowest vulnerability scores are countries are Switzerland, 
Japan, Germany, South Korea, Norway, Ireland, Austria, Sweden, Saudi Arabia, and France. 
(Table 8) Additionally, I found a significant disparity between the economic strength of the top 
vulnerable and resilient countries. In terms of country GDP and GDP per capita, the more 
vulnerable countries with higher volumes of aid projects and construction contracts consistently 
had weaker, less diverse economies than those of more resilient countries. (Figure 2) Vulnerable 
countries also had significantly higher trade deficits with China. Chinese economic activity in 
more resilient countries consists of investments, M&A, and subsidiary locations with comparably 
insignificant amounts of aid projects and construction contracts
TABLE 7: GLOBAL TOP TEN VULNERABLE COUNTRIES  

























I also identified a significant disparity between the economic strength of the top vulnerable and 
resilient countries. In terms of country GDP and GDP per capita, the more vulnerable countries 
with higher volumes of aid projects and construction contracts consistently had weaker, less 
diverse economies than the more resilient countries. (Figure 2) More vulnerable countries also had 
significantly higher trade deficits with China. I argue that these consistent compositional patterns 
of Chinese economic activity observed in my results reflect China’s exploitative global economic 
engagement strategy and targeted use of “debt-trap diplomacy, China’s economic statecraft 
method of choice when attempting to gain financial leverage over relatively poor economies, 
particularly those in Africa. 15 According to my results, the target countries of high vulnerability 
are exposed to greater risk due to a significant lack of financial leverage in the bi-directional 
economic relationship with the influencer which is then further exacerbated by the relative 
weakness of their economy. Therefore, it is the interaction of these two primary factors that 
fundamentally determine the overall vulnerability of the target country, encompassing the degree 
of China’s capability to exert influence and successfully alter the behavior of target countries via 
its existing economic leverage which is then contextualized and ultimately defined by the 
underlying economic strength of the intended target.
TABLE 8: GLOBAL TOP TEN LEAST VULNERABLE 
COUNTRIES  









9 Saudi Arabia 
10 France 
26 
TOP VULNERABLE TOP RESILIENT 
TOP  10 VULNERABLE & RESILIENT COUNTRY COMPARISON BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY VOLUME (2007-2019)& GDP PER CAPITA 
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Interestingly, Japan and South Korea, two Asian countries in close geographic proximity to 
Chinese borders, were amongst the top ten most resilient countries. While this did not necessarily 
align with my initial hypothesis and represented two significant outliers, the high resiliency of 
Japan and South Korea make complete logical sense when framed within their appropriate 
geopolitical context. In addition to Japan and South Korea being the two main regional economic 
powers competing with China, they are both historically aligned with the United States and its 
Western allies. I assert that my results reflect geopolitical reality of Japan and South Korea’s strong 
ties with the West, giving credence to the overall accuracy of my methodology and suggests that 
the rest of my country vulnerability scores are similarly authentic.  
 
Aside from the identified anomalies, the results of the top ten most vulnerable and least vulnerable 
countries reflected my initial hypothesis that Asian countries in closer geographic proximity to 
China would be the most vulnerable to Chinese economic influence while countries with strong 
economies in North America and Western Europe would have the lowest vulnerability; however, 
there were some results I did not anticipate when calculating the total and average vulnerability 
scores by world region. The regional averages of country vulnerability score in descending order 
are as follows: Africa, Asia, Oceania, South America, Central America & Caribbean, Eastern 
Europe, the Middle East, North America, and Western Europe. (Table 9)  
 










AFRICA 54 588.37 31,772 
ASIA 30 539.63 16,189 
OCEANIA 15 495.47 7,432 
SOUTH AMERICA 11 483.82 5,322 
CENTRAL AMERICA & 
CARIBBEAN 
22 463.27 10,192 
EASTERN EUROPE 21 451.95 9,491 
MIDDLE EAST 14 417.43 5,844 
NORTH AMERICA 2 303.00 606 
WESTERN EUROPE 23 239.83 5,516 
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The most surprising finding from these calculations was the regional totals and average found for 
Africa. Despite Asia dominating the top ten most vulnerable countries, a finding consistent with 
my initial hypothesis, Africa surpassed Asia in both regional total and average vulnerability score. 
These results somewhat contradicted my assumption of country vulnerability in Asia and instead, 
suggest that African countries are more exposed to Chinese economic influence than Asian 
countries within China’s immediate geographic periphery. Africa had the highest total and average 
country vulnerability score out of all world regions evaluated, followed by Asia with the second 
highest regional total, and are consistent with the regional composition of the top ten most 
vulnerable countries identified which were all located in either Africa or Asia.  
 
I found similar contradictory results when analyzing the total and average country vulnerability 
scores for the world regions of Oceania, Central America & Caribbean, and South America. 
Although Oceania has the third highest score in terms of average country vulnerability and 
consistent with my initial hypothesis that countries in closer geographic proximity to China are 
likely to have heightened vulnerability to Chinese economic influence, I noticed this result to be 
skewed by the way in which I decided to label world region for countries and changed significantly 
when applying alternative labeling conventions for country world region. For instance, I initially 
calculated the regional total and averages for South America and Central America & Caribbean, 
which can be considered as subregions of Latin America and universally labeled as such due to 
the ethic, cultural, and linguistic similarities of  countries encompassing both regions. When 
applying this common label to the 11 countries in South America and 22 countries in Central 
America & Caribbean, the Oceania still had the third highest regional average, however, the total 
vulnerability scores for the 33 Latin American countries was significantly higher than that of the 
15 countries in Oceania, indicating Latin American countries are more exposed to Chinese 
economic influence than those geographically closer to China in Oceania. 
 
When visualizing the volume of different Chinese economic activity types and average GDP per 
Capita of world regions, ordered by highest to lowest average country vulnerability score, I 
observed notable patterns and trends in Chinese economic engagement across world regions that 
appear to reflect the strategic priorities of the Chinese government and demonstrate the targeted 
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means of engagement China employs in the pursuit of expanding its global influence through 
economic activities abroad.  
 
For instance, my results show that Chinese construction contracts and aid projects were highest in 
Africa, indicating a consistent Chinese focus on these types of economic activities in the region. 
According to my data, the volume China’s aid projects in Africa account for approximately 51% 
of all Chinese aid projects globally. China’s construction contracts in Africa are similarly dominant 
in volume, accounting  around 34% of all international Chinese construction contracts. The total 
volumes of other economic activities in Africa such as investment, M&A, and subsidiary presence, 






FIGURE 3: WORLD REGIONS BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY VOLUME (2007 – 2019) & AVERAGE GDP PER CAPITA  
(DESCENDING BY AVERAGE COUNTRY VULNERABILITY SCORE) 
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To elaborate further, Africa represented 13% of Chinese global investment, 7% of Chinese 
subsidiary locations, and only 2% of international M&A deals. In terms of economic strength,  
Africa demonstrated the lowest value in average country GDP per Capita, indicating that along 
with experiencing the highest volumes of Chinese construction contracts and aid projects, it is also 
the weakest economic world region China interacts with. There also appears to be a consistent 
relationship between these specific economic activities with both country vulnerability and 
economic strength beyond Africa in which the regional totals of Chinese aid projects and 
construction contracts steadily increase in volume as average regional vulnerability scores 
increases and average regional GDP per Capita decreases. 
 
Together, these results indicate China has made a concerted effort to expand its economic influence 
in world regions outside of its immediate geographic periphery and are particularly focused on 
increasing their financial leverage in relatively weak economies located in Africa, Asia, and the 
two subregions of Latin America. Additionally, the dominant economic activities of construction 
contracts and aid projects in these regions appears to be consistent with the concept of as “debt-
trap diplomacy”, an exploitative form of economic statecraft that China is frequently accused using 
when economically engaging with poor countries in developing world regions.  
 
According to several studies on debt-trap diplomacy within the context of Chinese economic 
influence, experts largely agree that China most commonly targets poor countries in Africa with 
this method, however, they are also accused of doing so in Asia and Latin America. Aligned with 
my results, these studies state that Chinese debt-trap diplomacy mainly consists of large 
international aid projects and expensive infrastructure development initiatives (AKA construction 
contracts) which are used in tandem to place economically weak target countries in insurmountable 
levels of debt held by China-based financial institutions and banks, which are normally state-
owned entities ultimately controlled by the Chinese government. Given the Chinese creditor’s state 
ownership, the considerable debt solidifies China’s dominance in its bi-directional economic 
relationship with the target country, providing the Chinese government with the financial leverage 
necessary to alter target state behavior and effectively exert influence over the country which is 




Comparing UN Vote Solidarity, Country Vulnerability Scores, & Economic Activity  
Following the application of each country’s calculated UN vote solidarity with China between 
2007-2017, my results provide additional evidence supporting the overall accuracy of my 
methodology that not only further support the veracity of country vulnerability scores but provide 
statistical findings highlighting the potential impacts of Chinese economic influence on state 
behavior, encompassing correlative relationships identified between UN vote solidarity with China 
and country vulnerability scores, volume of outward economic activity type, regional location, and 
relative economic strength. To accurately interpret the significance of country vote solidarity 
percentages, it is important to note that the global average for UN vote solidarity with China is 
88%. First, the findings largely support my initial hypothesis that countries more exposed to 
Chinese economic influence would be more likely to vote in solidarity with China at the UN and 
consistent with my underlying assumption that the act of openly casting an oppositional vote 
against China on the international stage could provoke a negative economic response from China 
and result in severe financial consequences for countries with higher vulnerability scores. As I had 
anticipated, my results showed a positive correlation between country voting behavior at the UN 
and their corresponding vulnerability score.  
 
According to my comparative analysis of country vote solidarity percentages and vulnerability 
score, countries with higher vote solidarity percentages tended to also have higher vulnerability 
scores. This trend is consistent across the entirety of my results and can be observed in my 
comparative analysis of averages for the top 50 and top ten most vulnerable and resilient countries. 
For instance, the average vote solidarity percentage for the top 50 most vulnerable countries is 
96.09% while the average vote solidarity is 97.53% for the top ten most vulnerable countries 
(Table 10), both above the global average. Similarly, the top 50 least vulnerable (most resilient) 
countries have an average vote solidarity of 76.58% while the average for the top ten least 





























Additionally, these overarching trends in country vulnerability and UN vote solidarity can be 
observed further when generating comprehensive visualizations encompassing all 192 countries 
evaluated in my assessment and are also similarly reflected in focused visualizations on the top 
ten most vulnerable and resilient countries. (Figures 4 & 5)
TABLE 10: TOP TEN VULNERABLE COUNTRIES BY UN 
VOTE SOLIDARITY %   











TABLE 11: TOP TEN LEAST VULNERABLE COUNTRIES  BY 
UN VOTE SOLIDARITY % 















FIGURE 4: COUNTRY BY VULNERABILITY SCORE & UN VOTE SOLIDARITY WITH CHINA (2007 – 2017) 




I also identified several anomalies in country vote solidarity percentages when compared to 
corresponding country vulnerability scores and average vulnerability scores per world region. 
(Figures 6 & 7)  
 
FIGURE 6: COUNTRY VULNERABILITY SCORE & UN VOTE SOLIDARITY WITH CHINA (2007 – 2017) COLORED BY WORLD REGION  
& SIZED BY COUNTRY GDP PER CAPITA 
FIGURE 7: AVERAGE COUNTRY VULNERABILITY SCORE & UN VOTE SOLIDARITY WITH CHINA (2007 – 2017) BY WORLD REGION 




For instance, countries outside of the top ten most vulnerable had vote solidarity percentages above 
99%, such as Cuba (99.40%), Iran (99.37%), Zimbabwe (99.36%), and Myanmar (99.20%). 
Despite not being amongst the top vulnerable, these countries still had relatively high vulnerability 
scores when compared globally. Cuba and Iran were the only countries in this grouping that did 
not have vulnerability scores consistent with their significantly high vote solidarity percentages. 
In reviewing the economic data used to generate my vulnerability scores, I attribute this 
discrepancy to an apparent lack of information on these two countries when compared to that 
which was available for a majority of countries evaluated in my assessment. With more 
comprehensive economic data that addresses this recognized information gap, I anticipate that 
newly generated vulnerability scores for Cuba and Iran would be more consistent with their high 
vote solidarity percentages. 
Also, Saudi Arabia interestingly had a high vote solidarity percentage, one of the top ten most 
resilient countries. Unlike Iran and Cuba, there was a sufficient amount of bi-directional economic 
data available to accurately represent Saudi Arabia’s existing economic relationship with China. 
Similar to the seemingly anomalous country vulnerability scores generated for Japan and South 
Korea, which were largely inconsistent with regional vulnerability trends, the inconsistency of 
Saudi Arabia’s vote solidarity percentage and country vulnerability can be better understood when 
assessing their relationship through pointed qualitative research. According to several published 
works by subject matter experts, prominent think-tanks, and various mainstream news articles, 
China and Saudi Arabia have a uniquely robust economic relationship that has been expanding in 
recent years. For example, China and Saudi Arabia’s economic relationship was estimated to be 
worth approximately $85 billion in 2017 and  is mainly composed of bi-lateral exchanges within 
the energy sector, further solidifying Saudi Arabia’s position as China’s most prolific supplier of 
energy resources.17 In 2010 China surpassed the United States as the largest purchaser of Saudi oil 




strengthening their economic ties and discuss subsequent developments in the Sino-Saudi 
economic relationship with similar overarching themes, in which trade and investment in the oil 
and natural gas industry appear to consistently dominate the expanding bi-lateral economic 
exchange between the two countries. 19 
In light of this research, both Saudi Arabia’s low vulnerability score and high vote solidarity with 
China begin to make sense and my results appear to accurately reflect a relatively balanced, 
somewhat co-dependent Sino-Saudi economic relationship. In addition to Saudi Arabia possessing 
a relatively strong, stable economy, China’s leverage in the relationship does not outmatch its 
significant need for foreign energy resources that are largely provided by Saudi oil exports. Given 
China’s lack of energy interdependence, it is just as unlikely that China would be willing to risk 
targeting Saudi Arabia with economic coercion as the possibility that any such attempt would be 
capable of successfully pressuring Saudi Arabia to subjugate the pursuit of its own interests to 
benefit that of China. 
When analyzing a comparative graph visual of the UN vote solidarity percentages of the top ten 
most vulnerable and resilient countries by Chinese economic engagement type (Figure 8 – See on 
next page), country vote solidarity with China at the UN fluctuates from most vulnerable to most 
resilient countries similarly, yet in the opposite direction to that of GDP per Capita previously 
shown in Figure 2.   
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FIGURE 8: TOP 10 VULNERABLE & RESILIENT COUNTRY COMPARISON BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY VOLUME (2007 – 2019) & UN VOTE SOLIDARITY WITH CHINA  
(2007 – 2017) 





Additionally, there appears to be a similar upward-trending relationship between higher 
percentages of vote solidarity with higher volumes of Chinese aid projects and construction 
contracts that I previously identified for both country vulnerability and economic strength in GDP 
per Capita. These same trends are also apparent in comparative global visualizations of Chinese 
economic activity volume and average vote solidarity percentage of world regions listed in 
descending order from highest to lowest average country vulnerability. (Figure 9) 
As the above figure shows, average vote solidarity per region generally rises in accordance with 
increasing regional averages in country vulnerability and more specifically, rising volumes of 
Chinese aid projects and construction contracts, two of the alleged main ingredients of Chinese 
debt-trap diplomacy. Given that my focused top ten country results and assessment of regional 
averages both support this hypothesis, I argue that my findings on country vote solidarity further 
support the accuracy of my methodology and provide sufficient evidence to suggest that there is a 
positive correlative relationship between my quantification of country vulnerability to Chinese 
economic influence and country solidarity with China at the UN. When compared to my previous 
FIGURE 9: ECONOMIC ACTIVITY VOLUME (2007 – 2019) & AVERAGE UN VOTE SOLIDARITY WITH CHINA (2007 – 2017) BY WORLD 
REGION 
DATA SOURCES: THOMSON REUTERS EIKON; UNIWORLD ONLINE; 
WORLD BANK; AIDDATA.ORG; AEI GLOBAL CHINESE INVESTMENT 






regional visualization in Figure 3, the observable regional trends in average vote solidarity with 
China fluctuate in the same way towards more vulnerable world regions as average GDP per 
Capita, albeit in opposite direction. Similar with my initial hypothesis that regional economic 
strength represented by average country GDP per Capita would increase as regional averages of 
country vulnerability decreased, I anticipated that the regional averages of UN vote solidarity with 
China would increase as regional averages of country vulnerability increased.  
While regional averages in vote solidarity do not increase as smoothly with rising regional 
vulnerability scores as was seen in decreasing regional averages in GDP per Capita, the trends 
identified in my findings show certain observable similarities which deserve to be characterized 
as those holding statistical significance. For instance, Africa and Asia dominate regional averages 
in vote solidarity just as they demonstrated the highest averages for country vulnerability and 
lowest regional averages of country GDP per Capita. This, in addition to regional vote solidarity 
rising with increasing regional volumes of Chinese aid projects and construction contracts, further 
supports the claim that the composition of Chinese economic engagement is specifically tailored 















Overall, I conclude the findings of my research, including the generated country vulnerability 
scores of my methodology, the identified trends in Chinese economic activity, and the apparent 
impacts of country vulnerability on state behavior, collectively suggest that China’s current 
priority targets for economic influence efforts are Asian countries within its near-abroad. This 
finding is notably consistent with the realist concept of regional hegemonic power that was 
popularized by John Mearshimer in his 2001 work, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”. In this 
work, Mearshimer argues that emerging states, like modern-day China, first seek to establish 
regional hegemony in their immediate geographic periphery through dominating neighboring 
countries and bordering maritime regions before it is capable of challenging the supremacy of the 
current nation-state, like the United States, with global hegemonic status.20 China’s apparent 
economic focus within its Asian periphery reflected by the findings of my methodology are also 
consistent with scholars Pranab Bardhan and William J. Norris, who both argue that one of China’s 
primary strategic objectives is to strengthen its financial ties and trade relationships with countries 
in its near abroad and solidify its position as the dominant economic power in Asia. 21 
My findings also demonstrate China’s heightened interest in Africa and Latin America, 
representing a concerted Chinese effort in expanding its economic influence and geopolitical reach 
to low-GDP countries throughout these regions. As was demonstrated in the country vulnerability 
scores generated by my methodology and subsequent analysis of notable trends observed in 
Chinese economic activity, China is increasing its physical footprint in vulnerable developing 
third-world countries by establishing high volumes of Chinese-owned subsidiary locations and is 
actively seeking to subjugate weak global economies through exploitative economic engagement 
methods. According to my research, these methods most commonly include high volumes of 
International Aid Projects and Construction Contracts that specifically target poor developing 
countries for the purpose of placing them in insurmountable debt to the Chinese state-owned 
entities, effectively providing the Chinese government with the financial leverage necessary to 








For instance, the African countries identified with the highest vulnerability scores and found to 
have the greatest risk exposure to Chinese economic influence efforts are considered to be the 
amongst the most financially weak developing nations in the world. According to open-source 
media reports and published works by subject-matter experts on Africa’s economy, the same  
African countries experiencing the highest volumes of exploitative Chinese economic engagement 
are those constantly challenged by unstable political systems, ethnic violence, terrorism, disease, 
low-literacy rates, and underdeveloped energy, transportation, and telecommunications 
infrastructure. Along with their heavy reliance, and in some cases, outright dependency on foreign 
aid, these African countries have severely limited financial resources and are known to have a high 
tendency of placing themselves in debilitating financial debt in foreign currencies; significantly 
more so than developing countries in other world regions. This further exacerbates their persistent 
economic woes by dramatically limiting their negotiating power in international trade 
relationships.    
Due to these and several other complex historical and socio-economic factors, African countries 
are also generally considered to be highly vulnerable in terms of its risk exposure to fluctuations 
in the global economy as well as foreign attempts to exert economic influence in the region.  I 
argue that China fully understands these regional nuances and economic disadvantages unique to 
struggling African nations, yet instead of contributing to their own economic growth and 
sustainable development, the nature of Chinese economic activity observed  in these countries 
suggests China primarily seeks to exploit Africa’s inherent economic weaknesses as well as their 
tendency to depend on wealthier foreign nations. While this was most apparent in Africa, this same 
behavioral trend is also apparent in China’s economic engagement with weak economies in other 
developing world regions, such Latin America and the Caribbean.  
Given the consistency of my quantitative findings with accepted qualitative realities, I argue that 
the data-driven methodology I created not only produces accurate representations of China’s 
targeted use of exploitative economic engagement in vulnerable countries but offers an objective, 
non-biased view of China’s geo-strategic priorities. Since the methodology is dynamic, country 
vulnerability scores are subject to change based upon continuous inputs of new data encompassing 
fluctuations in outward-facing Chinese economic activity, inward-facing foreign economic 






Once enhanced with automation, live data streaming, change-detection alerting, additional 
economic data sources, and classified government information, I argue that national security 
analysts leveraging this methodology to assess threats associated with expanded Chinese global 
influence will be capable of yielding more accurate, timely, and actionable intelligence 
information provided to US policymakers. In the hands of intelligence community professionals 
with subject-matter expertise on China-related topics, such an improved version of my 
methodology can objectively identify the most at-risk countries exposed to Chinese economic 
influence and prioritize those requiring proportionally increased intelligence collection efforts. 
Additionally, if the methodology is automated and  further enhanced through the introduction of 
live data feeds, analysts would be able to actively monitor notable changes in country risk scores 
and quickly contextualize detected changes through isolating the specific shift in Chinese 
economic activity that prompted a significant increase or decrease in a country vulnerability. 
Without applying a flexible, objective, and repeatable quantitative methodology capable of 
continuously monitoring changes in country vulnerability to Chinese influence, detecting trends 
in global Chinese economic activity, and identifying the resulting correlative impacts on state 
behavior, US policy makers will be inhibited in their efforts to appropriately divert intelligence 
community collection requirements to the countries and world regions exposed to the greatest  
Chinese influence risks and restricted in their capability to develop informed policy decisions on 
the matter. The absence of non-biased, data-driven insights related to the threat of Chinese 
economic influence increases the chances that any future policy responses initiated to address the 
issue would be of a reactionary nature, and therefore, more likely to be ineffective in mitigating 
the threat before it becomes unmanageable and results in a volatile geopolitical crisis or dangerous 
military confrontation. Overall, the application of this methodology has the potential to increase 
the agility of the US intelligence community and facilitates more proactive responses to changes 
in the threat environment of China-related national security issues.  





All Country Vulnerability Scores with GDP, Calculated Net Difference Values, & UN Vote History   
(Negative $ Values in Highlight in Red)   
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Score 















UN Votes  
Cohesive 
UN Vote % 
Oppositional 
UN Vote % 
Cambodia 756 ASIA   $20,016.75 $3,700 $312,885.33 190 $28,980,844.67 653 15 97.75% 2.25% 
Liberia 752 AFRICA $2,101.00 $900 $14,187.22 80 $22,711,570.58 549 43 92.74% 7.26% 
Vietnam 731 ASIA   $205,276.17 $6,400 $1,700,281.07 127 $228,123,129.79 660 8 98.80% 1.20% 
Pakistan 719 ASIA   $278,913.37 $5,100 $1,003,826.46 199 $71,496,601.91 636 9 98.60% 1.40% 
Nepal 714 ASIA   $21,131.98 $2,500 $145,395.81 96 $15,957,399.34 641 15 97.71% 2.29% 
Niger 707 AFRICA $7,528.39 $1,100 $41,439.47 51 $11,041,622.73 574 8 98.63% 1.37% 
Kyrgyzstan 706 CENTRAL 
ASIA 
$6,551.29 $3,500 $77,097.18 40 $51,668,314.33 619 15 97.63% 2.37% 
Mozambique 696 AFRICA $11,014.86 $1,200 $77,645.76 73 $5,322,792.30 636 16 97.55% 2.45% 
Tanzania 696 AFRICA $47,340.07 $3,100 $136,334.42 109 $17,069,249.53 619 16 97.48% 2.52% 
Nigeria 691 AFRICA $404,652.72 $5,900 $731,091.31 101 $132,271,483.68 628 11 98.28% 1.72% 
Ethiopia 690 AFRICA $72,374.22 $1,900 $126,115.91 123 $16,195,676.27 603 10 98.37% 1.63% 
Bangladesh 689 ASIA   $221,415.16 $3,900 $180,703.12 107 $91,556,472.32 670 14 97.95% 2.05% 
Sudan 689 AFRICA $95,584.38 $4,400 $403,362.21 97 $22,241,082.02 665 10 98.52% 1.48% 
Kenya 687 AFRICA $70,529.01 $3,400 $118,731.81 118 $31,263,346.31 602 10 98.37% 1.63% 
Ghana 684 AFRICA $42,689.78 $4,400 $115,420.94 104 $26,665,965.08 562 24 95.90% 4.10% 
Tajikistan 681 CENTRAL 
ASIA 
$6,951.66 $3,000 $101,280.18 36 $13,872,844.70 618 16 97.48% 2.52% 
Myanmar 678 ASIA   $63,225.10 $5,800 $395,788.59 70 $22,174,891.37 620 5 99.20% 0.80% 
Togo 671 AFRICA $4,400.00 $1,600 $12,393.05 37 $17,403,861.57 586 26 95.75% 4.25% 




Cameroon 669 AFRICA $32,217.50 $3,200 $151,379.66 97 $5,691,143.39 416 12 97.20% 2.80% 
Indonesia 669 ASIA   $932,259.18 $11,700 $4,686,648.01 212 $79,538,310.84 667 15 97.80% 2.20% 
Uganda 663 AFRICA $24,078.93 $2,100 $123,687.19 75 $5,000,081.83 561 7 98.77% 1.23% 
Chad 663 AFRICA $9,600.76 $2,400 $390,742.01 30 $1,894,607.45 367 18 95.32% 4.68% 
Ukraine 656 EASTERN 
EUROPE                      
$93,270.48 $8,300 $162,013.56 48 $415,962,491.54 394 154 71.90% 28.10% 
Tonga 654 OCEANIA                             $401.56 $5,400 $281.85 45 $16,857,577.22 386 27 93.46% 6.54% 
Uzbekistan 649 CENTRAL 
ASIA 
$67,220.34 $6,600 $765,917.77 57 $7,496,662.71 589 12 98.00% 2.00% 
Sri Lanka 645 ASIA   $81,321.88 $12,300 $154,339.26 123 $31,545,626.73 667 19 97.23% 2.77% 




EUROPE                      
$1,283,162.99 $8,748 $1,528,055.14 89 $45,767,220.91 564 32 94.63% 5.37% 
Benin 642 AFRICA $8,583.03 $2,100 $14,643.15 22 $23,993,436.86 577 26 95.69% 4.31% 
Mali 634 AFRICA $14,034.98 $2,300 $49,332.98 69 $1,716,181.08 634 13 97.99% 2.01% 
Ivory Coast 632 AFRICA $36,372.61 $1,526 $53,596.58 42 $7,561,286.86 528 27 95.14% 4.86% 
Zimbabwe 631 AFRICA $16,619.96 $2,000 $121,437.38 136 $1,498,913.77 617 4 99.36% 0.64% 
Syria 629 MIDDLE 
EAST 
$59,150.00 $2,900 $439,456.56 15 $17,063,211.76 637 7 98.91% 1.09% 
Rwanda 628 AFRICA $8,376.05 $702 $1,470.26 52 $2,574,297.02 338 16 95.48% 4.52% 
Madagascar 628 AFRICA $10,001.19 $1,500 $37,062.81 25 $5,445,496.00 514 30 94.49% 5.51% 
Malawi 624 AFRICA $5,433.04 $1,100 $14,501.74 37 $1,360,723.17 536 32 94.37% 5.63% 
Republic of 
the Congo 
623 AFRICA $7,833.51 $2,307 $130,605.34 77 $30,293,392.51 625 16 97.50% 2.50% 
Sierra Leone 622 AFRICA $3,736.59 $1,700 $33,409.99 65 $2,270,987.55 479 24 95.23% 4.77% 
Senegal 612 AFRICA $14,683.70 $2,600 $36,907.22 33 $7,996,251.32 645 20 96.99% 3.01% 
Algeria 612 AFRICA $159,049.10 $15,000 $634,622.31 42 $41,514,289.50 673 14 97.96% 2.04% 
Djibouti 606 AFRICA $1,727.00 $3,400 $2,383.67 21 $8,847,404.15 645 24 96.41% 3.59% 
Turkey 605 MIDDLE 
EAST 
$863,711.71 $24,900 $4,489,221.54 74 $109,489,312.40 471 144 76.59% 23.41% 
Burundi 603 AFRICA $3,007.03 $800 $162.35 44 $385,905.19 481 26 94.87% 5.13% 
Egypt 603 AFRICA $332,791.05 $12,600 $223,650.29 56 $72,692,883.66 657 13 98.06% 1.94% 
Ecuador 602 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
$98,613.97 $11,100 $192,719.15 53 $14,731,602.38 656 13 98.06% 1.94% 
Zambia 599 AFRICA $21,063.99 $3,900 $199,073.44 103 $15,763,769.24 624 17 97.35% 2.65% 







591 AFRICA $35,381.78 $800 $53,267.16 61 $0.00 313 8 97.51% 2.49% 
Namibia 586 AFRICA $10,947.88 $11,300 $115,950.99 57 $790,219.80 611 13 97.92% 2.08% 
Sao Tome 584 AFRICA $342.78 $1,756 $1,750.00 8 $2,899,832.46 282 13 95.59% 4.41% 
Lesotho 583 AFRICA $2,291.32 $3,600 $22,817.75 27 $900,439.16 616 11 98.25% 1.75% 
Fiji 582 OCEANIA                             $4,703.63 $9,300 $23,999.74 47 $1,991,355.24 544 21 96.28% 3.72% 
Mongolia 582 ASIA   $11,183.46 $12,300 $497,637.65 73 $13,473,281.73 615 21 96.70% 3.30% 
Jordan 579 MIDDLE 
EAST 
$38,654.73 $12,300 $112,073.75 31 $25,158,811.57 650 26 96.15% 3.85% 
Guinea-Bissau 577 AFRICA $1,164.94 $620 $499.45 21 $56,304.79 532 23 95.86% 4.14% 
Vanuatu 573 OCEANIA                             $773.50 $2,600 $196.06 24 $1,099,779.82 363 43 89.41% 10.59% 
Afghanistan 571 ASIA   $19,469.02 $1,900 $7,021.71 40 $2,933,583.81 656 26 96.19% 3.81% 
India 570 ASIA   $2,263,792.50 $6,600 $188,311.40 19 $395,915,485.91 611 20 96.83% 3.17% 
Comoros 570 AFRICA $616.65 $1,500 $14.46 21 $260,253.74 530 18 96.72% 3.28% 
Eritrea 566 AFRICA $2,608.00 $1,400 $14,028.73 19 $30,180.40 635 16 97.54% 2.46% 
Georgia 560 EASTERN 
EUROPE                      
$14,378.02 $10,000 $95,471.24 24 $5,658,081.04 377 135 73.63% 26.37% 
Guyana 557 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
$3,502.40 $7,900 $29,008.18 24 $1,051,911.31 652 15 97.75% 2.25% 





$348,743.27 $67,900 $1,720,237.00 45 $242,041,353.76 651 25 96.30% 3.70% 
Haiti 552 CENTRAL 
AMERICA & 
CARIBBEAN     
$8,022.64 $1,800 $13,472.56 10 $2,839,119.12 499 31 94.15% 5.85% 
Micronesia 551 OCEANIA                             $329.90 $3,068 $48.73 29 $54,072.30 178 320 35.74% 64.26% 
Colombia 551 SOUTH 
AMERICA 






CARIBBEAN     
$770.80 $7,030 $0.00 0 $61,515,078.99 630 10 98.44% 1.56% 
Bolivia 547 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
$33,806.40 $7,200 $34,451.50 56 $1,386,772.22 635 15 97.69% 2.31% 
Somalia 545 AFRICA $6,217.00 $400 $21.75 13 $974,837.10 449 18 96.15% 3.85% 
Marshall 
Islands 
542 OCEANIA                             $194.50 $3,300 $3.65 -1 $18,088,203.72 247 315 43.95% 56.05% 
Maldives 540 ASIA   $4,224.21 $15,500 $17,206.43 49 $1,146,238.37 656 37 94.66% 5.34% 




Nauru 536 OCEANIA                             $102.06 $11,600 $0.00 0 $40,236,227.89 158 167 48.62% 51.38% 
Suriname 535 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
$3,278.43 $14,000 $27,960.90 11 $7,397,130.96 580 9 98.47% 1.53% 
Botswana 534 AFRICA $15,581.14 $17,000 $158,565.64 35 $1,371,404.06 609 40 93.84% 6.16% 
Tunisia 532 AFRICA $42,062.55 $11,600 $44,844.80 25 $12,409,233.81 647 26 96.14% 3.86% 
Gambia 530 AFRICA $964.60 $1,700 $0.00 0 $2,178,735.90 422 15 96.57% 3.43% 
Jamaica 529 CENTRAL 
AMERICA & 
CARIBBEAN     




524 AFRICA $1,756.12 $700 $54.90 12 $109,426.08 397 25 94.08% 5.92% 
Mexico 513 CENTRAL 
AMERICA & 
CARIBBEAN     
$1,046,922.70 $18,900 $270,371.66 18 $184,620,641.21 607 46 92.96% 7.04% 
Hungary 513 EASTERN 
EUROPE                      
$125,816.64 $27,500 $172,419.00 19 $49,097,189.04 390 167 70.02% 29.98% 
Belarus 511 EASTERN 
EUROPE                      
$47,407.22 $18,000 $96,687.59 58 $1,619,459.80 617 10 98.41% 1.59% 
Nicaragua 509 CENTRAL 
AMERICA & 
CARIBBEAN     
$13,230.84 $5,500 $14,032.00 5 $6,444,652.49 669 13 98.09% 1.91% 
Papua New 
Guinea 
506 OCEANIA                             $20,213.21 $3,500 $5,413.50 55 $1,257,041.01 526 32 94.27% 5.73% 
Kiribati 505 OCEANIA                             $181.55 $1,800 $0.00 0 $176,463.48 211 40 84.06% 15.94% 
Tuvalu 505 OCEANIA                             $34.22 $3,500 $0.00 0 $4,466,558.05 453 38 92.26% 7.74% 
Mauritius 504 AFRICA $12,168.44 $20,400 $70,459.60 19 $5,855,849.07 635 23 96.50% 3.50% 
Azerbaijan 503 CENTRAL 
ASIA 
$37,847.72 $17,400 $438,870.17 10 $5,274,436.18 621 20 96.88% 3.12% 
Barbados 503 CENTRAL 
AMERICA & 
CARIBBEAN     
$4,529.05 $17,100 $115,961.74 11 $681,483.87 635 33 95.06% 4.94% 
Mauritania 499 AFRICA $4,739.30 $4,300 $1,969.98 31 $6,015,305.70 625 21 96.75% 3.25% 
Angola 499 AFRICA $95,335.11 $6,800 $127,145.70 99 $192,925,775.85 588 12 98.00% 2.00% 
Libya 499 AFRICA $34,700.00 $8,700 $558,512.10 18 $6,479,412.87 649 20 97.01% 2.99% 
Samoa 498 OCEANIA                             $786.36 $5,500 $198.46 12 $1,422,250.71 524 52 90.97% 9.03% 
Argentina 498 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
$545,476.10 $20,000 $634,294.02 26 $10,598,067.56 619 49 92.66% 7.34% 
Cape Verde 498 AFRICA $1,617.00 $6,700 $343.50 12 $454,695.61 606 36 94.39% 5.61% 
Kazakhstan 498 CENTRAL 
ASIA 




Yemen 496 MIDDLE 
EAST 
$27,317.61 $2,400 $23,994.38 33 $8,828,523.02 638 21 96.81% 3.19% 
Palau 486 OCEANIA                             $310.25 $15,400 $0.00 0 $15,136,416.80 182 341 34.80% 65.20% 
Venezuela 483 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
$371,000.00 $13,800 $802,152.20 83 $36,693,753.77 658 15 97.77% 2.23% 
Moldova 482 EASTERN 
EUROPE                      
$6,749.52 $5,300 $104.19 12 $894,976.96 396 143 73.47% 26.53% 
Panama 482 CENTRAL 
AMERICA & 
CARIBBEAN     
$55,187.70 $23,000 $132,711.00 -1 $123,274,359.26 547 70 88.65% 11.35% 
Dominica 478 CENTRAL 
AMERICA & 
CARIBBEAN     





CARIBBEAN     
$1,460.14 $14,353 $1,106.89 7 $4,232,210.49 618 20 96.87% 3.13% 
Albania 477 EASTERN 
EUROPE                      
$11,863.87 $11,800 $10,004.42 22 $1,682,686.65 393 150 72.38% 27.62% 
Philippines 476 ASIA   $304,905.41 $7,700 $367,835.73 40 $15,220,503.76 650 17 97.45% 2.55% 
Portugal 475 WESTERN 
EUROPE                      
$205,184.48 $28,900 $501,190.18 10 $14,505,348.02 408 155 72.47% 27.53% 
Greece 475 WESTERN 
EUROPE                      
$192,690.81 $26,700 $69,163.75 20 $36,515,513.87 426 137 75.67% 24.33% 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
475 AFRICA $10,684.80 $38,600 $151,921.33 49 $13,643,366.53 274 12 95.80% 4.20% 
Poland 470 EASTERN 
EUROPE                      
$471,364.41 $27,800 $348,956.23 5 $90,614,352.77 391 167 70.07% 29.93% 
Seychelles 467 AFRICA $1,427.32 $27,600 $109,069.61 2 $384,572.13 272 19 93.47% 6.53% 





CARIBBEAN     
$21,894.71 $31,900 $90,398.76 26 $2,021,729.67 638 18 97.26% 2.74% 
Thailand 463 ASIA   $407,026.13 $16,900 $2,503,107.02 66 $43,253,231.14 647 21 96.86% 3.14% 
Costa Rica 463 CENTRAL 
AMERICA & 
CARIBBEAN     
$57,435.51 $16,400 $390,446.20 37 $20,069,589.98 634 50 92.69% 7.31% 
Peru 462 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
$192,207.34 $12,900 $264,281.60 50 $28,130,108.35 610 48 92.71% 7.29% 
Burkina Faso 460 AFRICA $11,693.24 $1,800 $13,239.00 1 $251,769.80 609 25 96.06% 3.94% 
Guatemala 457 CENTRAL 
AMERICA & 
CARIBBEAN     
$68,763.26 $7,900 $13,939.00 2 $13,894,128.35 611 46 93.00% 7.00% 
Paraguay 456 CENTRAL 
AMERICA & 
CARIBBEAN     







EUROPE                      




EUROPE                      
$16,910.28 $11,000 $24,270.80 10 $631,221.96 412 137 75.05% 24.95% 
Bahrain 450 MIDDLE 
EAST 
$32,179.07 $50,700 $249,669.00 6 $7,407,435.15 654 28 95.89% 4.11% 
Brazil 450 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
$1,796,186.59 $15,200 $494,807.56 125 $143,242,750.33 650 31 95.45% 4.55% 
Macedonia 449 EASTERN 
EUROPE                      
$10,899.58 $14,600 $25,801.43 15 $59,734.81 297 112 72.62% 27.38% 
Cuba 447 CENTRAL 
AMERICA & 
CARIBBEAN     
$87,132.80 $11,900 $23,334.60 12 $6,671,709.91 660 4 99.40% 0.60% 
Gabon 447 AFRICA $14,213.56 $19,100 $54,543.55 39 $7,464,386.70 440 25 94.62% 5.38% 
Honduras 445 CENTRAL 
AMERICA & 
CARIBBEAN     
$21,516.94 $5,300 $350.00 1 $5,294,529.99 559 54 91.19% 8.81% 
Solomon 
Islands 
444 OCEANIA                             $1,202.13 $2,000 $0.00 0 $2,943,079.50 614 41 93.74% 6.26% 
Armenia 442 EASTERN 
EUROPE                      
$10,572.30 $8,600 $13,262.05 4 $233,833.22 532 24 95.68% 4.32% 
Bulgaria 439 EASTERN 
EUROPE                      
$53,237.88 $20,300 $61,143.00 13 $4,898,139.97 390 158 71.17% 28.83% 
Grenada 436 CENTRAL 
AMERICA & 
CARIBBEAN     
$1,056.19 $14,100 $119.49 8 $85,994.53 511 29 94.63% 5.37% 
Qatar 434 MIDDLE 
EAST 
$152,451.92 $127,700 $380,129.00 19 $7,199,379.95 652 20 97.02% 2.98% 
El Salvador 433 CENTRAL 
AMERICA & 
CARIBBEAN     
$26,797.47 $8,900 $13,239.00 1 $4,626,342.39 604 41 93.64% 6.36% 
New Zealand 432 OCEANIA                             $184,970.68 $37,300 $561,748.91 50 $13,217,303.56 436 139 75.83% 24.17% 
Saint Lucia 428 CENTRAL 
AMERICA & 
CARIBBEAN     
$1,379.00 $7,744 $0.00 0 $151,330.87 641 27 95.96% 4.04% 
Bhutan 425 ASIA   $2,212.64 $8,200 $0.00 0 $107,372.63 611 24 96.22% 3.78% 
Singapore 418 ASIA   $296,975.68 $87,900 $2,341,894.95 -2532 $178,441,308.78 661 11 98.36% 1.64% 
Latvia 408 EASTERN 
EUROPE                      
$27,572.70 $25,700 $13,351.00 3 $10,435,395.66 388 163 70.42% 29.58% 
Turkmenistan 408 CENTRAL 
ASIA 
$36,179.89 $17,500 $347,550.34 10 $37,982,876.51 537 12 97.81% 2.19% 
Malta 407 WESTERN 
EUROPE                      
$10,999.05 $39,900 $22,461.16 -3 $13,267,231.30 442 139 76.08% 23.92% 
Belize 405 CENTRAL 
AMERICA & 
CARIBBEAN     




Canada 401 NORTHERN 
AMERICA                    
$1,535,767.74 $46,400 $3,182,935.62 -3295 $91,063,079.54 255 335 43.22% 56.78% 
Montenegro 398 EASTERN 
EUROPE                      





CARIBBEAN     
$71,583.55 $16,000 $13,239.00 1 $8,984,833.00 656 29 95.77% 4.23% 
American 
Samoa 
394 OCEANIA                             $658.00 $13,000 $6.00 -1 $11,583.24 524 52 90.97% 9.03% 
Cyprus 390 MIDDLE 
EAST 
$20,047.01 $35,000 $1,120.98 5 $9,650,778.80 444 144 75.51% 24.49% 
Bahamas 386 CENTRAL 
AMERICA & 
CARIBBEAN     
$11,261.80 $24,600 $5,389.73 -1 $5,593,556.24 627 39 94.14% 5.86% 
Uruguay 386 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
$52,419.72 $21,500 $23,492.31 19 $381,547.76 635 40 94.07% 5.93% 




CARIBBEAN     
$916.90 $16,725 $0.00 0 $70,925.05 428 23 94.90% 5.10% 
Lithuania 382 EASTERN 
EUROPE                      
$42,773.03 $30,000 $13,194.00 2 $12,350,631.01 390 165 70.27% 29.73% 
Swaziland 379 AFRICA $3,720.65 $9,800 $0.00 0 $27,412.87 502 10 98.05% 1.95% 
Lebanon 377 MIDDLE 
EAST 
$49,598.83 $18,500 $1.22 5 $17,281,426.62 641 17 97.42% 2.58% 
Iran 373 ASIA   $418,976.68 $18,100 $135,436.14 40 $68,539,147.21 635 4 99.37% 0.63% 
Slovakia 371 EASTERN 
EUROPE                      
$89.55 $31,300 $163.00 1 $188,519.49 397 164 70.77% 29.23% 
Iraq 368 MIDDLE 
EAST 
$171,489.00 $17,900 $59,140.37 35 $50,259,457.17 656 24 96.47% 3.53% 
Slovenia 357 EASTERN 
EUROPE                      
$44,708.60 $32,100 $781.00 1 $11,379,831.81 405 158 71.94% 28.06% 
Luxembourg 355 WESTERN 
EUROPE                      
$58,631.32 $104,000 $85,548.71 -1261 $18,837,344.67 402 161 71.40% 28.60% 
Romania 354 EASTERN 
EUROPE                      
$187,592.04 $22,300 $58,336.00 15 $0.00 390 152 71.96% 28.04% 
Croatia 350 EASTERN 
EUROPE                      
$50,714.96 $22,800 $58.00 3 $12,573,415.46 390 150 72.22% 27.78% 
Estonia 322 EASTERN 
EUROPE                      
$23,337.91 $29,300 $0.17 -2 $8,482,460.75 397 163 70.89% 29.11% 
San Marino 307 WESTERN 
EUROPE                      
$1,590.71 $59,500 $0.00 0 $65,239.46 417 144 74.33% 25.67% 
South Africa 301 AFRICA $295,456.19 $13,200 $189,938.52 -435 $140,651,279.18 644 18 97.28% 2.72% 
Malaysia 297 ASIA   $296,535.93 $27,300 $1,698,656.04 -333 $124,539,038.63 668 19 97.23% 2.77% 
Andorra 289 WESTERN 
EUROPE                      
$2,858.52 $49,900 $0.15 -1 $56,897.43 398 144 73.43% 26.57% 
Israel 278 MIDDLE 
EAST 




Spain 269 WESTERN 
EUROPE                      
$1,237,255.02 $36,400 $124,906.37 -234 $153,985,566.88 408 159 71.96% 28.04% 
Belgium 260 WESTERN 
EUROPE                      
$467,955.71 $45,000 $309,334.26 -412 $100,976,538.15 394 165 70.48% 29.52% 
Oman 258 MIDDLE 
EAST 
$66,293.37 $46,700 $23,638.00 5 $118,276,007.12 668 17 97.52% 2.48% 
Finland 252 WESTERN 
EUROPE                      
$238,677.67 $42,200 $2,698,309.39 -433 $26,811,674.57 401 150 72.78% 27.22% 
Chile 251 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
$247,027.91 $24,100 $80,723.08 -42 $67,505,213.22 637 51 92.59% 7.41% 
Kuwait 251 MIDDLE 
EAST 
$110,875.58 $71,900 $176,987.89 -5 $45,428,702.86 652 18 97.31% 2.69% 
Italy 248 WESTERN 
EUROPE                      
$1,859,383.61 $36,800 $1,906,500.53 -687 $154,417,176.33 402 162 71.28% 28.72% 
Denmark 241 WESTERN 
EUROPE                      
$306,899.65 $48,000 $1,561,614.10 -804 $32,539,924.14 396 168 70.21% 29.79% 
Netherlands 239 WESTERN 
EUROPE                      
$777,227.54 $51,000 $4,160,571.29 -1685 $465,833,883.70 391 170 69.70% 30.30% 
Iceland 238 WESTERN 
EUROPE                      
$20,304.10 $49,200 $2,786.85 -5 $534,149.70 409 149 73.30% 26.70% 
Monaco 237 WESTERN 
EUROPE                      
$6,075.00 $115,700 $4,100.00 -5 $0.00 378 152 71.32% 28.68% 
Liechtenstein 231 WESTERN 
EUROPE                      
$6,289.17 $139,100 $1,370.23 -96 $0.00 421 144 74.51% 25.49% 




EUROPE                      
$2,650,850.18 $42,500 $8,173,156.89 -9898 $385,938,909.22 330 235 58.41% 41.59% 
France 222 WESTERN 
EUROPE                      
$2,465,453.98 $42,300 $8,786,284.63 -2414 $106,977,862.38 339 194 63.60% 36.40% 
United States 205 NORTHERN 
AMERICA                    
$18,624,475.00 $57,400 $254,922,928.30 -32124 $2,121,905,334.04 95 525 15.32% 84.68% 
Saudi Arabia 174 MIDDLE 
EAST 
$646,438.38 $55,200 $1,242,894.00 36 $224,244,332.34 637 27 95.93% 4.07% 
Sweden 156 WESTERN 
EUROPE                      
$514,459.97 $49,800 $1,793,545.08 -1162 $4,082,010.87 416 143 74.42% 25.58% 
Austria 105 WESTERN 
EUROPE                      
$390,799.99 $48,000 $419,006.38 -325 $16,790,474.05 424 138 75.44% 24.56% 
Ireland 102 WESTERN 
EUROPE                      
$304,819.02 $69,200 $1,651,153.89 -545 $5,119,446.97 417 141 74.73% 25.27% 
Norway 97 WESTERN 
EUROPE                      
$371,075.24 $69,200 $324,067.46 -727 $3,292,220.94 402 144 73.63% 26.37% 
South Korea 56 ASIA   $1,411,245.59 $37,700 $5,249,788.56 -2447 $606,164,227.01 381 110 77.60% 22.40% 
Germany 48 WESTERN 
EUROPE                      
$3,477,796.27 $48,100 $12,637,817.35 -2762 $33,248,091.30 393 175 69.19% 30.81% 
Japan 44 ASIA   $4,949,273.34 $41,300 $40,985,074.62 -5382 $99,712,211.27 426 121 77.88% 22.12% 
Switzerland 39 WESTERN 
EUROPE                      










World Bank. “World GDP (current US$)”, Accessed October 31, 2019. URL: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.cd?most_recent_value_desc=true&view=map  
 
2 United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), “Worldwide Threat 
Assessment of the US Intelligence Community”, January 29, 2019. Pg 25. URL: 
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf 
 
3 Ban, Cornel. Blyth, Mark. (2013) The BRICs and the Washington Consensus: An introduction. 
Review of International Political Economic. Vol. 20: pp. 241 – 255  
 
4 Horn, Reinhart, & Trebesch (2019) “China’s Overseas Lending” NBER Working Paper 
#26050. July 2019. 
 
5 Richard Bluhm, Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks, Austin Strange, and Michael 
Tierney. 2018. Connective Financing: Chinese Infrastructure Projects and the Diffusion of 
Economic Activity in Developing Countries. AidData Working Paper #64. Williamsburg, VA: 
AidData at William & Mary. 
URL: https://www.aiddata.org/publications/connective-finance-chinese-infrastructure-projects 
 
6 Dreher, Axel, and Andreas Fuchs. 2015. “Rogue Aid? An Empirical Analysis of China’s Aid 
Allocation.” Canadian Journal of Economics 48 (3): 988–1023.  
URL: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291540-5982.  
 
7 Mauro, Paolo and Jan Zilinsky “Which Countries are most exposed to China?” Peterson 




8 International Trade Transactions: China Import/Export transactions (2007-2017). World Bank, 
World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). URL: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-
integrated-trade-solution-trade-stats  
 
9 Foreign Investment: Public Ownership Holdings Screener, Private Equity Investment Screener 
(2007 – 2019). Thomson Reuters Eikon. 
 
Greenfield Investments (2007 – 2019). AEI Chinese Global Investment Tracker. URL: 
https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/  
 








11 Foreign Subsidiaries: Chinese Subsidiaries Search, Uniworld Online. URL: 
https://uniworldonline.com/ 
 
12 International Aid Projects: AidData; Chinese International Aid Projects (2007 – 2014) URL: 
https://www.aiddata.org/ 
 
13 Infrastructure Development Contracts: Chinese Construction Projects (2007 – 2019). AEI 
Chinese Global Investment Tracker. URL: https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/ 
 
14 Khanh Vu, Mai Nguyen, and John Ruwitch, “China warns citizens in Vietnam after protests 




Richard Heydarian, “As Indonesia stands up to China, who will follow in Southeast Asia?”, 




15 Colonel Douglas W. Winton, United States Army, “China’s Economic Statecraft in Africa: 
Implications for the U.S. Rebalance”, United States Army War College, March 2013, URL: 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a589900.pdf   
 
16 Semungus H. Gebrehiwot and Biruk M. Demissie, “Can China Bring Peace to Africa?”, The 
Diplomat, September 10, 2018, URL: https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/can-china-bring-peace-
to-africa/  
 
Lina Benabdallah, “China-Africa military ties have deepened. Here are 4 things to know.”, 




Eleanor Albert, “China in Africa”, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), July 12, 2017, URL: 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-africa   
 
Colonel Douglas W. Winton, United States Army, “China’s Economic Statecraft in Africa: 
Implications for the U.S. Rebalance”, United States Army War College, March 2013, URL: 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a589900.pdf  
 
Vannarith Chheang, “China’s Economic Statecraft in Southeast Asia”, Yusof Ishak Institute 








Dr. James Reilly, “The China Model: Economic Statecraft in Action”, Australian Institute of 




Evan A. Feignbaum, “Is Coercion the New Normal in China's Economic Statecraft?”, Carnegie 




Robert Farley, “Economic Statecraft and Managing Superpowers: How China Did It”, The 
Diplomat, June 30, 2017, URL: https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/economic-statecraft-and-
managing-superpowers-how-china-did-it/  
 
Colonel Douglas W. Winton, United States Army, “China’s Economic Statecraft in Africa: 
Implications for the U.S. Rebalance”, United States Army War College, March 2013, URL: 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a589900.pdf 
 
17 Gramer, Robbie. “Saudi Arabia, China Sign Deals Worth Up to $65 Billion.” Foreign Policy, 
Foreign Policy, 25 July 2019, foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/16/saudi-arabia-china-sign-deals-
worth-65-billion-boost-trade-ties-oil-energy-one-belt-one-road-saudi-vision-2030/.    
 
18 Mouawad, Jad. “China's Growth Shifts the Geopolitics of Oil.” The New York Times, The 




19 Khojji, Zaynab. “China's Crude Oil Imports from Saudi Arabia up 43%.” Arab News, 
Arabnews, 25 May 2019, www.arabnews.com/node/1501906/business-economy.  
 
Neuhauser, Alan. “Saudi Arabia's Pivot to Asia.” U.S. News &amp; World Report, U.S. News 
&amp; World Report, 23 Aug. 2019, www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2019-08-
23/saudi-arabia-longtime-us-ally-builds-ties-with-china. 
 
20 Mearsheimer, John J., “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2001. Pgs. 22-23 
 
21 Bardhan, Parnab. “Awakening Giants, Feet of Clay: Assessing the Economic Rise of China 
and India”, Journal of Chinese Political Science 19, May 2014. Pgs. 227-229 
 
Norris, William J., “Chinese Economic Statecraft: Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy, and State 
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• Government Analyst I (March 2016 –April 2019)  
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• Business Delivery Manager (October 2019 – Present) 
As a Government Analyst I and II at TRSS, I leveraged proprietary economic data, public records, 
various analytic tools, and open source research to assist government clients in various analytic 
endeavors such as private sector risk, economic sector forecasting, social media trend analysis, 
targeting and network analysis, sanctions compliance, foreign economic influence, 
counterintelligence risk, locational threat assessments, executive protection, and geopolitical trend 
analysis. Additionally, I worked extensively with other analysts, data scientists, software 
engineers, and business development leads to generate proof of concept (POC) reports showcasing 
new ways to leverage TRSS proprietary, third-party, and open-source data sets in response to 
evolving client needs on emerging topics and/or trends with significant national security 
implications.  
In my current role as a Business Delivery Manager at TRSS, I apply my extensive knowledge of 
the company’s services acquired during my 5-year tenure as a high-performing TRSS analyst and 
interpersonal skills to directly serve the Business Development team in expanding the TRSS 
customer base as well as maintain existing clientele within the US Intelligence Community. My 
responsibilities include identifying new business opportunities and prospective clients, building 
industry partnerships, identifying and vetting prospective external TRSS consultants, project 
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concept (POC) reports for potential new customers, identifying new technologies and data 
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UNDERGRADUATE INTERNSHIPS  
Analysis Intern at Thomson Reuters Special Services (TRSS): May 2015 – February 2016 
As an analysis intern at Thomson Reuters Special Services, LLC, a cleared U.S. defense contractor, 
I assisted the analysis department in their mission to deliver a comprehensive suite of solutions 
that are designed to help professionals achieve mission objectives, address uncertainty, and 
identify and manage risk. In support of an analyst team of intelligence professionals, we aimed to 
leverage Thomson Reuters’ market-leading solutions to help our clients perform intelligence 
collection and analysis in the topic areas of international politics, social media, military, threat 
finance, insider threat, risk management, cybersecurity, counterintelligence, targeting and network 
analysis, and identity analysis.  
Operations Intern at the Washington Regional Threat & Analysis Center (WRTAC): 
January 2015 – April 2015 
Assisted Washington Regional Threat and Analysis Center (WRTAC), the sole Fusion Center for 
Washington DC, as an Operations Intern in their mission to ensure the domestic security of the 
District of Columbia and greater National Capital Region through producing intelligence products 
for local consumers and facilitating interagency coordination between federal, state and local 
entities. Highlights from my internship include: 
• Produced and briefed strategic and tactical intelligence reports on various threats that were 
determined to have a direct nexus to the residents, local law enforcement, federal agencies, 
government buildings, national monuments, and US government employees located 
throughout the Washington DC metro area. Disseminated finished intelligence products to 
the greater U.S. intelligence community through the Homeland Security Information 
Network (HSIN) 
 
• Assisted in Mutual Agency Cooperation Center (MACC) threat monitoring effort on behalf 
of the WRTAC for the Presidential State of the Union Address on January 20, 2015. 
 
• Facilitated interagency coordination and information sharing efforts through managing 
fusion center “open house” events where various local and federal agencies would learn 
about the WRTAC functional capabilities and assist in our mission to protect Washington 










Intelligence Bureau Intern at the New Jersey office of Homeland Security & Preparedness 
(NJOHSP): May 2014 – August 2014  
OHSP is the Governor’s Directorate office for homeland security and disaster preparedness in the 
state of New Jersey. During my position as an Intelligence Bureau intern at OHSP, I aassisted the 
agency’s intelligence apparatus located at the Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC), 
New Jersey’s sole Fusion Center, in research and analysis efforts related to the production and 
dissemination of finished intelligence products. OHSP intelligence reports were intended to ensure 
the domestic security of the State of New Jersey by providing the residents of New Jersey, NJ State 
Police, municipal police departments, and regionally located offices of US federal law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies with relevant information regarding active national security 
threats with a nexus to the state and criminal activity posing credible risks to local law 
enforcement. Highlights from my internship include: 
• Wrote a strategic intelligence product on future projections of al-Qaida and ISIS related to the 
developing situations in the regions of Iraq and Syria using structured analytic techniques. 
• Provided tactical analysis related to domestic terrorist attacks inspired by anti-government 
websites and the implications for local law enforcement. 
• Briefed the Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC) command staff as well as FBI, 
ATF, and DHS liaison personnel on the anti- government inspired attacks on law enforcement 
and how to increase officer awareness on anti-government extremists.  I also conducted 
impromptu briefing for a team of Federal US Marshals on the subject. 
Open Source Research and Analysis Intern at the National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism & Responses to Terrorism (START): January 2014 – May 2014 
The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) is a 
university-based research and education center comprised of an international network of 
scholars committed to the scientific study of the causes and human consequences of terrorism in 
the United States and around the world. START is an officially designated center of excellence by 
the US Department of Homeland Security and is headquartered at the University of Maryland. At 
START I interned as an open-source researcher and analyst on a Department of Defense funded 
project called PIT (Project on Illicit Trafficking). Highlights of my internship include: 
• Provided detailed profile on assigned transnational criminal organizations operating in either 
Europe or North Africa including group history, current activities, hierarchal structure, 
fungible resources, illicit market presence, smuggling networks, geographic location, ideology, 
and the psychological/ personality traits of the group’s leadership. 
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